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The Montana Constitution's equal protection clause guaran-
tees "individual dignity" for each person by "prohibiting private as
well as public discrimination."' Moreover, it has the potential of
providing this guarantee to a larger number of individuals than
does any other state constitution. The individual dignity clause
provides:
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any
person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against
any person in the exercise of his [or her] civil or political rights
on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition,
or political or religious ideas.2
Although the individual dignity clause has existed since the
adoption of the 1972 Constitution, the portion of the clause that
prohibits discrimination by private parties has remained dormant.'
If the Montana Supreme Court were to apply a proper analysis to
the clause, an analysis founded in the provision's express language,
Montana would provide its citizens greater protection from dis-
crimination than does any other state. Such a result would ensue
because Montana's individual dignity clause guarantees that the
"dignity of the human being is inviolable," by protecting individu-
als from private, as well as public, discrimination and from une-
qual protection of the laws.
To assist Montana courts in the full application of Montana's
individual dignity clause, this comment first surveys the history of
* The author thanks Professor Larry Elison, University of Montana School of Law, for
his advice and comments; Marshall Murray, Esq., Kalispell, Montana, for furnishing Consti-
tutional Convention research materials; and Mae Nan Ellingson, Esq., Missoula, Montana,
for her insight into a possible interpretation of the delegates' intent. Any omissions or er-
rors, however, are strictly the author's.
1. V MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS 1642 (1972) [hereinafter
TRANSCRIPTS].
2. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
3. In re Will of Cram, 186 Mont. 37, 606 P.2d 145 (1980), provided the court an oppor-
tunity to utilize the private action portion of the individual dignity clause, but the court did
not address the clause in its decision. See infra Part III.
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the clause's formation, enumerating the sources of the clause's lan-
guage. It then focuses on the intent of the 1972 Montana Constitu-
tional Convention Delegates and the Montana Supreme Court's re-
luctance to give substance to that intent. This comment further
provides three possible analyses which the judiciary could use to
fulfill the delegates' intent to eradicate discrimination in Montana.
Finally, this comment addresses the probable defense that would
be raised if the Montana Supreme Court were to enforce the pri-
vate action provision of the individual dignity clause.
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to the convening of the 1972 Constitutional Convention,
the Montana Constitutional Commission hired researchers and
analysts to examine the rights and protections guaranteed to
Montanans by the United States Constitution and the 1889 Mon-
tana Constitution.4 Their findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions were made available to the Convention delegates while the
delegates drafted and debated each of the 1972 constitutional pro-
visions. 5 The researchers and analysts reported that the fourteenth
amendment of the federal constitution protected Montanans from
governmental discrimination, 6 and that the 1889 Montana Consti-
tution lacked an express equal protection clause.7 The federal
equal protection clause expressly provides, "No State shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."' In essence, the amendment guarantees that under the
law each individual will be treated the same as other individuals
who are similarly situated. 9 Unfortunately, however, the fourteenth
amendment "erects no shield against merely private conduct, how-
ever discriminatory or wrongful.""0
4. Interview with Marshall Murray, Attorney and Constitutional Convention Dele-
gate: Rules and Resolutions Committee Chairman, Bill of Rights Committee Member, in
Kalispell, Montana (January 25, 1990) [hereinafter Interview with Marshall Murray]. See
also V MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OCCASIONAL PAPERS: Comparison of the Mon-
tana Constitution with the Constitutions of Selected Other States iii.
5. Interview with Marshall Murray, supra note 4.
6. X MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION STUDIES: Bill of Rights 308.
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. In McFarland v. Goins, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated,
If the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States means any-
thing at all, it certainly means that all citizens of the United States shall stand
equal before the law, and that no special privilege or benefits shall be given to one
class of citizens to the exclusion of the other ....
96 Miss, 67, 75, 50 So. 493, 493 (1909).
10. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
[Vol. 51
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Although the 1889 Montana Constitution included a "Declara-
tion of Rights,"'" it did not contain a specific "equal protection"
provision. Instead, Montanans relied upon the fourteenth amend-
ment and its "equality before the law" guarantee for protection
from discrimination. 12 Montanans also benefitted from certain con-
stitutional provisions and statutes designed to prohibit some forms
of discrimination. In particular, the 1889 Constitution contained
"anti-discrimination" provisions that gave aliens the protection
they needed to acquire property and settle in the state." The stat-
utes provided each citizen protection from discrimination in 1) em-
ployment 4 and 2) access to public facilities or accommodations, 5
"because of race, creed, color or national origin."'" These state pro-
visions, however, did not protect Montanans from either discrimi-
nation by the state or by private individuals. This absence of pro-
tection from discrimination served as an impetus for the "people's
crusade" of the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention, which
led to the drafting of a "progressive" declaration of rights. 7
III. THE INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY CLAUSE
When drafting Montana's individual dignity clause, the con-
vention delegates apparently borrowed portions from the equal
protection provisions of one U.S. commonwealth and three states.
Specifically, Constitutional Commission researchers highlighted
the equal protection clauses of Puerto Rico, New York, Michigan,
and Illinois as examples of progressive, protective provisions.' The
drafters fused the relevant and eloquent portions of these various
sources to achieve the current individual dignity provision.
A. "The dignity of the human being is inviolable."
As one delegate stated while presenting the individual dignity
clause to the convention, the provision is "quite similar to that of
11. See MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III.
12. X MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION STUDIES: Bill of Rights 308.
13. For example, art. III, § 25 of the 1889 MONTANA CONSTITUTION protected an alien's
right to acquisition and possession of mines and other real property.
14. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA § 64-301 (1947) [hereinafter REV. CODES OF MONT.].
15. REV. CODES OF MONT. §§ 64-211, -301.
16. REV. CODES OF MONT. §§ 64-211, -301 to -303.
17. Birnbaum, Fresh Chance Gulch, TIME, Apr. 10, 1972, at 18.
18. Several of these jurisdictions had held conventions within relatively recent years,
and the others were considered illustrative state constitutions by authorities. V MONTANA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OCCASIONAL PAPERS: Comparison of Montana Constitution
with the Constitutions of Selected Other States iii.
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the Puerto Rico declaration of rights . . . ."'I A comparison of the
two demonstrates their similarity. The Puerto Rico provision pro-
vides in part:
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. All men [and
women] are equal before the law. No discrimination shall be
made on account of race, color, sex, birth, social origin or condi-
tion, or political or religious ideas .... 20
This provision does not specify exactly "who" is prohibited from
discriminating, but implies through its broad language that the
prohibition extends to both governmental and private discrimina-
tion. Moreover, when the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has inter-
preted this broad language, the court has held that this language
does extend to private discrimination.21 In Gonzalez v. Superior
Court,22 the court held that the family tradition of passing from
father to son the rum recipe used in the family business impermis-
sibly excluded female family members solely because of their sex.2
The court found that this practice violated the Puerto Rico Decla-
ration of Rights.24 This holding may aid the Montana Supreme
Court when confronted with a similar private discrimination
situation.
B. "Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or
institution shall discriminate"
The language protecting Montanans from private discrimina-
tion originated in the New York equal protection provision, which
provides in part:
No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be sub-
jected to any discrimination in his [or her] civil rights by any
other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the
state or any agency or subdivision of the state.2 5
19. V TRANSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 1642 (statement by Delegate Rachell K.
Mansfield).
20. P.R. CONST. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added).
21. Gonzalez v. Superior Ct., 97 P.R.R. 788 (1969).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 791.
24. Id. The Gonzalez court stated,
Whatever the family tradition might be, the Constitution of the Commonwealth
does not permit that there be discrimination between [members of the family] by
reason of sex. The family tradition may be kept among the heirs and interested
parties, but they cannot have the benefit of the court to make good, against the
laws and the Constitution, a discrimination.
Id.
25. NEW YORK CONST. art. I, § 11 (emphasis added).
556 [Vol. 51
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Even though the clause purports to prohibit private discrimina-
tion, the New York judiciary has refused to apply the clause as
such. Rather the courts limit the clause's application to those vio-
lations involving "state action, ' '2 e thereby robbing from the New
York Constitution the capacity to assist in removing discrimina-
tion from the private sector. The New York courts' continued re-
fusal to allow the state equal protection provision to afford greater
protection from discrimination than its federal counterpart negates
the purpose of having the clause at all, and offers no private action
analysis which the Montana courts could adopt.
C. "in the exercise of his civil or political rights"
Drafters of Montana's individual dignity clause modeled the
"civil or political rights" language after Michigan's equal protec-
tion provision, which provides in part:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor
shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political
rights .... 27
This language appears to limit protection from discrimination to
those instances in which individuals are attempting to exercise
their civil or political rights. Rather than basing an equal protec-
tion analysis on this distinctive language, however, the Michigan
courts have chosen to interpret the clause to "afford 'the same
rights as the Federal equal protection clause.' "28 Therefore, al-
though Montana found this language instructive, judicial interpre-
tation of the Michigan provision provides Montana no guidance in
defining the words "civil or political rights," or in understanding
the words' application to discriminatory actions.
26. Telephone interview with Larry Kahn, Deputy Solicitor General, New York State
Dep't of Law (February 2, 1990). See People v. McCray, which held:
[Tihere is nothing in the language or history of our State equal protection provi-
sion (art. I, § 11) which suggests that the scope of the rights guaranteed by this
provision should extend beyond the rights guaranteed by the equal protection
clause of our Federal Constitution ....
McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 550, 443 N.E.2d 915, 919, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 445 (1982).
New York courts began equating the New York equal protection provision with the
fourteenth amendment of the UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town
Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 530, 87 N.E.2d 541, 548 (1949) (later upheld in Esler v. Walters, 56
N.Y.2d 306, 314, 437 N.E.2d 1090, 1094, 452 N.Y.S.2d 333, 337 (1982)).
27. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added).
28. Michigan State Employees Ass'n v. Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n, 94 Mich.
App. 677, 688, 290 N.W.2d 729, 734 (1980) (quoting Fox v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 379
Mich. 579, 588, 153 N.W.2d 644, 647 (1967)). Michigan's equal protection clause promotes,
although not exclusively, "equal opportunities in employment, education, housing and pub-
lic accommodation." MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2 (convention comment).
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D. "on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or
condition, or political or religious ideas"
The Constitutional Convention Delegates drafted this lan-
guage after reviewing several different constitutions, each of which
denoted certain classes of individuals as "suspect. 2 9 Montana's
enumeration of suspect classes is not identical to any one source;
however, it strongly resembles the language of the Puerto Rican
provision.30
The convention transcripts document specific intent for two of
the classes. First, the delegates included "sex" in this list because
they "saw no reason for the state to wait for the adoption of the
federal equal rights amendment."31 Second, the delegates included
"culture" to protect "groups whose cultural base is distinct from
mainstream Montana, especially the American Indians. '32 These
statements imply Montana's willingness to stand at the forefront
of protecting the individual from invidious discrimination.
The Montana Supreme Court has addressed most of the enu-
merated suspect classes, including race,3" sex,3" social or economic
condition, 6 religion,"6 and politics.3 7 Culture is the only enumer-
29. The term "suspect class" originated in Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944), and later was defined as one,
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.
San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1972).
30. Each of the state constitutions from which the individual dignity clause's language
originated included an enumeration of suspect classes. By state, they are:
Puerto Rico: "race, color, sex, birth, social origin or condition, or political or religious
ideas," P.R. CONST. art. II, § 1.
New York: "race, color, creed or religion," NEw YORK CONST. art. I, § 11.
Michigan: "religion, race, color or national origin," MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2.
Illinois: "race, color, creed, national ancestry or sex," ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
31. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 1642 (statement by Delegate Rachell K.
Mansfield).
32. Id.
33. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (denying tribal members access to
Montana courts does not violate equal protection); B.M. v. State, 200 Mont. 58, 649 P.2d
425 (1982) (consideration of ethnic background during psychological examination did not
violate equal protection).
34. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D.C.
Mont. 1981), vacated and remanded, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987), judgment reinstated and re-
manded to district court for determination of appropriate attorney fees and costs, 228
Mont. 505, 744 P.2d 871 (1987) (employer may not terminate employment because of preg-
nancy); State v. Craig, 169 Mont. 150, 545 P.2d 649 (1976) (gender classification in crime of
sexual intercourse without consent does not violate equal protection). See also Comment:
Toward Dignity in the Workplace: Miller-Wohl and Beyond, 49 MONT. L. REv. 147 (1988)
(authored by Wendy A. Fitzgerald).
35. State v. Farrell, 207 Mont. 483, 676 P.2d 168 (1984) (financial conditions should be
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 51 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 17
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/17
1990] MONTANA'S INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY CLAUSE 559
ated suspect class that the court has not yet had the opportunity
to address. The court, however, has expanded this list of suspect
classes to include age. 8
IV. THE MEANING OF MONTANA'S INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY CLAUSE
A. Intent
The Constitutional Convention transcripts reveal two possible
interpretations of the delegates' intent for the individual dignity
clause, while the clause's language provides a third. These inten-
tions can be summarized as follows: 1) total eradication of discrim-
ination;39 2) eradication of discrimination in the employment,
rental and "quasi-public" settings;40 and 3) eradication of discrimi-
nation in the exercise of civil or political rights.4"
The first possible interpretation of the delegates' original in-
tent, total eradication of discrimination, is a reasonable one, for
three reasons. First, when Delegate and Bill of Rights Committee
member Rachell K. Mansfield introduced the clause to the conven-
tion floor, she stated that the clause was "a constitutional impetus
for the eradication of public and private discrimination." '42 Sec-
ondly, the entire language of the clause indicates that total eradi-
cation of discrimination was what the drafters intended:
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be
considered in criminal sentencing, however, should not be used as a reason for imposing the
maximum punishment); McClanathan v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 186 Mont. 56, 606 P.2d 507
(1980) (social condition was intended to prevent discrimination of the poor, not parents or
those totally disabled).
36. Ham v. Holy Rosary Hosp., 165 Mont. 369, 529 P.2d 361 (1974) (private hospital
can prescribe terms of treatment-decided pursuant to REV. CODES OF MONT. § 69-5217
(1947)).
37. Dorn v. Board of Trustees of Billings School Dist. No. 2, 203 Mont. 136, 661 P.2d
426 (1983) (public school policy of prohibiting political activities within building violated
first amendment rights); Bowden v. Anaconda Co., 38 St. Rep. 1974, 1974 (D.C. Mont. 1981)
(transfer of employee "to eliminate any public confusion as to whether the particular em-
ployee speaks for himself or for the employer" did not constitute discrimination based on
political ideas) (apparently not reported in the Federal Supplement).
38. Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 219 Mont. 426, 712 P.2d 1309 (1986) (age re-
quirement for welfare benefits violates the 1972 Montana Constitution); In re C.S., 210
Mont. 144, 687 P.2d 57 (1984) (considering age when criminally sentencing youth did not
violate equal protection under the Montana State Constitution).
39. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 1642 (statement by Delegate Rachell K.
Mansfield).
40. Id. at 1643 (statement by Delegate Wade J. Dahood).
41. Convention Delegate Mae Nan Ellingson provided this third possible intent of the
drafters. Interview with Mae Nan Ellingson, Attorney, Missoula, Montana (January 28,
1990) [hereinafter Interview with Mae Nan Ellingson].
42. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 1642.
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denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any
person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against
any person in the exercise of his [or her] civil or political rights
on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition,
or political or religious ideas.' 3
Finally, the Montana Constitution as a whole was an original docu-
ment that broke new ground in state constitutional law by ex-
panding the rights afforded the citizens of Montana. A progressive
interpretation of the individual dignity clause, as the clause's in-
troduction and wording compel, would conform with the general
pioneer spirit of the convention and the unique nature of the re-
sulting Montana Constitution.
The second possible interpretation of the delegates' intent de-
veloped from the expressed concerns of certain delegates about the
provision's broad language and the potential for its abuse."' This
group of delegates feared that the clause's wording meant that the
clause applied to all possible areas of discrimination. Delegate Otto
T. Habedank in particular worried about invasion of his privacy,
specifically the manner by which this provision could prohibit or-
ganizations like the Sons of Norway from enforcing their tradi-
tional membership requirements. 5 He hypothesized that the pri-
vate action portion of the individual dignity clause could force the
group to accept persons with whom he would not share a common
heritage."' In response to these concerns, the chairperson of the
Bill of Rights Committee, Delegate Wade J. Dahood, articulated a
second possible intent 7 for the individual dignity clause, one that
differed markedly from that offered by Delegate Rachell K. Mans-
field. Delegate Dahood's interpretation would restrict the applica-
tion of the private action portion of the individual dignity clause
"to employment, to rental practices, to actual [association] in mat-
ters that are public or matters that tend to be somewhat quasi-
public."" This interpretation of intent soothed several delegates'
43. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4. The convention delegates adopted Delegate Proposal
number 61, introduced by Delegate Richard J. Champoux and signed by Delegates William
A. Burkhardt, Marshall Murray, J. Mason Melvin, and Jerome J. Cate. I TRANSCRIPTS,
supra note 1, at 161.
44. Discussion focused on the deletion of "by any person, firm, corporation or institu-
tion." V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 1642.
45. Id. at 1643.
46. Id.
47. See text accompanying supra note 40.
48. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 1643. This intent mirrors that of the Illinois equal
protection clause as documented in the Commission Studies. See X MONTANA CONSTITUTION
CONVENTION COMMISSION STUDIES: Bill of Rights 310-11. Illinois limits private action for dis-
crimination to the "hiring and promotion practices of any employer or in the sale or rental
[Vol. 51
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concerns, including Delegate Habedank's. At the conclusion of the
convention discussion, the motion to delete the words "by any per-
son, firm, corporation or institution" failed,49 and the delegates
unanimously approved the individual dignity clause as written.50
Because Delegate Dahood's interpretation of intent immediately
preceded the clause's approval, the convention delegates may have
based their votes on that interpretation. For this reason, Delegate
Dahood's interpretation is perhaps the most plausible explanation
of the intent of the clause.
The third and final possible interpretation of the delegates'
original intent stems from the words "in the exercise of his [or her]
civil or political rights,"'" which seems to limit the breadth of the
clause. This interpretation, however, may be anomalous. The tran-
scripts themselves do not suggest that the drafters intended to
prohibit discrimination only in the exercise of "civil or political
rights." Moreover, when deciding discrimination cases involving
state action, the Montana Supreme Court has yet to apply this
limitation.2 Thus, the court should not then apply this limitation
when confronted with a private discrimination case. To do so
would create a dichotomy of necessary elements between actions
against the state and those actions against private individuals. Be-
cause the words themselves do not impart such a dichotomy, the
Montana Supreme Court should remain consistent and reject this
analysis for private discrimination actions as well.
Assuming the court does choose to require the exercise of civil
or political rights before utilizing the individual dignity clause, the
court must then decide whether to define these rights broadly or
narrowly. A broad definition would, in essence, protect individuals
in all aspects of their lives, similar to the first interpretation. For
example, the Montana Constitution provides Montana citizens ina-
lienable rights, including, in part, the rights "of pursuing life's ba-
sic necessities ... and seeking their safety, health and happiness in
all lawful ways . . . .,5 By defining "seeking happiness" broadly,
the court would interpret the individual dignity clause as encom-
of property." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17. Also, Delegate Dahood reminded the delegates that the
"federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... encompass[ed] some of the fears that [were] expressed
...." V TRANSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 1643. This limited intent also parallels the protections
provided in the REV. CODES OF MONT. contemporaneous with the 1889 CONSTITUTION. Supra
notes 14-16.
49. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 1646. Thirteen (13) delegates voted for the dele-
tion of the private action provision, seventy-six (76) voted against such a deletion. Id.
50. Id.
51. Interview with Mae Nan Ellingson, supra note 41.
52. See supra notes 33-38.
53. MONT. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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passing almost all activities or interests and, therefore, would en-
able the court to prohibit discrimination in virtually all circum-
stances. Conversely, a narrower definition could limit "civil rights"
to only those rights or freedoms provided citizens by their govern-
ment.4 A narrow definition of civil or political rights was suggested
by the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Gafford.5 5 In that case,
the court stated that the criminal defendant lost his "political and
civil rights" due to incarceration.5 6 The court defined civil rights as
those "incident to citizenship such as the right to vote, the right to
hold public office, the right to serve as a juror in our courts and the
panoply of rights possessed by all citizens under the laws of the
land. '5 7 Although this enumeration may permit an expansive read-
ing, the court's enumeration necessarily constricts the breadth of
the individual dignity clause.
If the court adopts a narrow definition of civil or political
rights, this final possible interpretation of the delegates' original
intent is the least plausible of the three. First, the overall progres-
sive atmosphere of the convention suggests the delegates' desire to
expand rather than to contract the rights of Montana citizens. Sec-
ond, the federal equal protection clause does not limit protection
from discrimination only to situations in which citizens attempt to
exercise civil or political rights. 8 A progressive state constitution
would not limit protections in this way either. Finally, the express
language of the clause declares the "dignity of the human being"
to be "inviolable." Such a limited protection would violate that
dignity.
B. Interpretation
Since the adoption of the 1972 Montana Constitution, the
Montana Supreme Court has not interpreted the private action
portion of the individual dignity clause. At least one case, In re
Will of Cram,59 however, provided the Montana Supreme Court
54. Sult v. Gilbert, 148 Fla. 31, 3 So.2d 729 (1941). See also 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil
Rights, § 1 (1976).
55. 172 Mont. 380, 563 P.2d 1129 (1977).
56. Id. at 389-90, 563 P.2d at 1134.
57. Id. See also MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 49, ch. 1, pt. 2 (1989). "Civil rights" include
"political rights" because both arise from the government and its laws. Some courts distin-
guish the two by specifying political rights as those which arise from the administration of
and participation in government. Anthony v. Burrow, 129 F. 783 (C.C. Kan. 1904); Byers v.
Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 139 P. 948 (1914).
58. If the Montana courts impose such a restriction on the individual dignity clause,
the provision could be found unconstitutional because the fourteenth amendment of the
U.S. CONSTITUTION does not provide for such a limitation.
59. 186 Mont. 37, 606 P.2d 145 (1980).
[Vol. 51
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with the opportunity to use this constitutional tool to assist in the
elimination of discrimination.6
In Cram, the decedent's will provided for the distribution of
funds to male members of either the Future Farmers of America
(F.F.A.) or the 4-H clubs who resided in the decedent's home
county. 1 Mr. Cram specifically requested that the male recipients
use the cash awards to purchase sheep to raise as F.F.A. and 4-H
projects.2 The plaintiff alleged discrimination against female
members of the groups on the basis of sex. 3 The trial court found
state action involved through the participation of the F.F.A. and 4-
H clubs' leaders, who were hired to administer the programs as
employees of the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruc-
tion and the State University System." The trial court, however,
did not invalidate the will.6 5 It merely modified the will to remove
the participation of the clubs' leaders, thereby removing the state
action which the court found to be a violation of the fourteenth
amendment of the federal constitution. 6
By affirming the district court's holding, the Montana Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of a will that clearly dis-
criminated on the basis of sex. The appellants had expressly ar-
gued that Montana's individual dignity clause had been violated. 7
Instead of addressing those arguments, however, the court limited
its analysis to an interpretation of the federal constitution. In its
holding, the court cited only the fourteenth amendment as a
source of protection from discrimination in Montana, and virtually
ignored the alleged violation of the Montana Constitution. 8 The
Montana Supreme Court's analysis and holding in Cram may re-
veal its predilection to require state action in discrimination ac-
tions brought under Montana's Constitution. Since the Cram deci-
sion, the court has not acknowledged the private action portion of
the clause, thus the clause remains dormant, untouched by defini-
tion or application.
60. Id. Anne MacIntyre, Administrator of the Montana Human Rights Commission,
discussed In re Will of Cram during the Constitutional Convention Symposium, Missoula,
Montana (Nov. 16, 1989).
61. Id. at 39, 606 P.2d at 147.
62. Id.
63. Brief for Appellant at 18-19, In re Will of Cram, 186 Mont. 37, 606 P.2d 145 (1980)
(No. 14670).
64. Cram, 186 Mont. at 44, 606 P.2d at 150.
65. Id. at 45, 606 P.2d at 150.
66. Id.
67. Brief for Appellant at 18-19, In re Will of Cram, 186 Mont. 37, 606 P.2d 145 (1980)
(No. 14670).
68. Cram, 186 Mont. at 37, 606 P.2d at 145. 11
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V. PROPOSED ANALYSES OF PRIVATE ACTION IN MONTANA'S
INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY CLAUSE
To ensure that each individual's dignity remains intact, free
from discrimination, attorneys must use the individual dignity
clause to the full extent intended by the drafters.69 Because there
are no prior judicial decisions that apply this clause, no guidance
for attorneys or judges exists. This section sets forth three analy-
ses, each designed to explain the possible interpretations of the
drafters' original intent behind the individual dignity clause. The
section then hypothesizes court holdings utilizing the facts of
Cram for each analysis. Under all three analyses, the court must
answer two initial factual questions: First, did discrimination oc-
cur?70  Second, was that discrimination based on a suspect
classification?
A. Analysis One: Total Eradication of Discrimination
Total eradication of discrimination, by either the government
or individuals, requires a broad application of the individual dig-
nity clause. If the court, based on the facts of the particular case,
were to answer both of the initial questions affirmatively, then no
further analysis would be needed. A violation of the individual dig-
nity clause would have occurred. No restriction could limit the ex-
istence of this protection or exclude certain entities from its prohi-
bition. Broad application of the individual dignity clause,
therefore, would fulfill Delegate Mansfield's intent, as expressed on
the convention floor. Further, such an application would ensure
that individual dignity would remain inviolable, regardless of who
committed the discrimination or when that discrimination
occurred.
If the Cram court had used such an analysis, it would have
determined first that the will of Cram impermissibly classified men
and women, thus the requisite discrimination would have occurred.
Secondly, the court would have evaluated the basis for this dis-
69. Because the individual dignity clause is not self-executing, the Montana Legisla-
ture could implement a statutory provision to provide Montanans a cause-of-action for pri-
vate discrimination specifically, or could modify and expand the protections provided by
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-102 (1989). Such a provision's language and content though are be-
yond the scope of this comment. Currently the Montana statutes protect individuals from
discrimination in various settings including in part employment, housing and education. See
tit. 49, MONT. CODE ANN. (1989).
70. "Discrimination" is the act by which one "confer[s] particular privileges on a class
arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons, all of whom stand in the same relation
to the privileges granted and between whom and those not favored no reasonable distinction
can be found." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 420 (5th ed. 1979).
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crimination. Because the trustees of the will had discriminated
against female F.F.A. and 4-H members solely because of their
gender, the court would have concluded that discrimination based
on a suspect classification had occurred. Therefore, under this
analysis, the will's trust would have violated the individual dignity
clause.
Had the Cram court applied this analysis, the female members
would have received the financial benefits of the trust along with
their male peers. Such an equal distribution would have furnished
financial incentive for females to participate in predominantly
male activities. Additionally, equal distribution of financial bene-
fits would have provided each person, regardless of gender, the op-
portunity to partake fully in the organization's activities and to
reap the benefits that those activities provide.
B. Analysis Two: Eradication of Discrimination That Occurs in
Employment, Rental or Quasi-Public Settings
If the application of the individual dignity clause were limited
in the manner suggested by Delegate Wade Dahood, the protection
provided by the clause would ensure the inviolability of an individ-
ual's dignity only within public or quasi-public parameters.71
Outside those parameters, anyone could discriminate.72 Under this
second analysis, after answering the initial factual questions af-
firmatively, the court then would determine whether that discrimi-
nation occurred in a public or quasi-public setting.73 A positive
finding would constitute a violation of the individual dignity
clause.
Applying this analysis to Cram, the court would have looked
at the will to determine whether it constituted a public or quasi-
public setting. Because of the personal nature of such an estate
transaction, the court most likely would have determined that this
did not constitute a public or quasi-public setting. Therefore,
under this analysis, the will's trustees could have denied female
members of F.F.A. and 4-H any benefits from the trust, simply be-
cause of their gender.
71. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 1643.
72. The CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS are unclear as to whether Delegate
Dahood intended this limitation to apply in public as well as private actions. This limitation
could promote governmental discrimination in areas personal in nature and, thus, destroy
any meaning in the individual dignity clause's declaration that "[t]he dignity of the human
being is inviolable." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
73. "Public" may be easy to define, but "quasi-public" poses another definition left for
determination by the courts. "Quasi-public" may be those areas private in nature, but regu-
lated through the government, such as rentals. 13
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C. Analysis Three: Eradication of Discrimination Which
Occurs When a Person is Exercising Civil or Political Rights1 4
Analysis three is similar to analysis two. Under this analysis, if
the court were to limit the protection provided by the individual
dignity clause only to those situations when people exercise civil or
political rights, the court essentially would establish parameters,
outside of which discrimination would be tolerated. After answer-
ing the first two factual questions affirmatively, the court would
then need to determine if the discrimination occurred while the
person was exercising his or her civil or political rights. A positive
finding would constitute an individual dignity clause violation.
If the Cram court had applied this analysis, it would have had
to determine if receipt of a trust's financial benefits constituted a
civil or political right. If the court were to have defined "civil or
political rights" broadly, in accordance with the delegates' intent
to provide rights and protections beyond those found in the United
States Constitution, it undoubtedly would have found the right to
receive these benefits embodied in one of the state constitution's
broad clauses.75 Therefore, the female members would have se-
cured the same financial, social, and educational benefits as those
received by male members.
Conversely, if the court were to use a narrow definition of
"civil or political rights,"76 then the court would necessarily have
determined that receiving the benefits of a private trust falls
outside the scope of a civil or political right. Thus, the court would
have held that the trust could preclude the female members of
F.F.A. and 4-H from receiving the financial benefits of the Cram
will without violating the individual dignity clause. Consequently,
the narrow definition of civil or political rights would encourage
such classifications of individuals which would benefit people
inequitably.
D. The Solution
Analyses two and three, which limit the application of the in-
dividual dignity clause, would eliminate some discrimination in
Montana, while allowing purely private discrimination to endure.
Under a state constitution founded on individualism, tolerance of
any discrimination seems contrary to Montana's stated goals. The
Montana Supreme Court should adopt the first, "total eradication"
74. Interview with Mae Nan Ellingson, supra note 41.
75. For example, see text accompanying supra note 53.
76. See text accompanying supra notes 55-57.
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analysis, an analysis which would further the drafters' intent to
provide Montanans with broad protection from discrimination.
VI. CONSIDERATIONS WHEN IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSED
ANALYSIS
When private individuals attempt to enforce their right to
equal protection through the judicial system, Montana courts may
face a challenge to such enforcement based on the discriminating
party's constitutional right to privacy. 77 Montana's constitution
provides that "[tihe right of individual privacy is essential to the
well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the
showing of a compelling state interest. 7' The defending party may
argue that court enforcement of equal protection constitutes "state
action," and thus requires the state to demonstrate a "compelling
state interest" before the state can infringe upon the privacy
rights.79 This argument, however, should fail for three reasons: 1)
the Montana Constitution Convention delegates intended the
equal protection provision to overcome the state action require-
ment, 0 2) the United States Supreme Court in Shelley v. Krae-
mer,81 and in similar federal "state action" cases, never envisioned
that the holding would extend to private action, and 3) the only
way to give both clauses efficacy is to interpret the privacy clause
to prohibit governmental intrusion rather than governmental
enforcement.
First, the researchers and drafters of Montana's individual
77. The Montana Supreme Court faced a similar challenge in Montana Human Rights
Div. v. City of Billings, 199 Mont. 434, 649 P.2d 1283 (1982). In that case, the city of Billings
was accused of discriminating in its employment practices. The court held that the Human
Rights Division's need to investigate the alleged discrimination, by scrutinizing personnel
records of employees (who were not the complainants), outweighed the employees' rights to
privacy.
78. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
79. Id.
80. The language of the clause and the transcripts reveal this intent. See note and
accompanying text, supra note 1.
81. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The United States Supreme Court consolidated and ruled on
two actions, one from Missouri and one from Michigan, both concerning issues of private
agreements which exclude persons based on race or color. In Shelley, landowners sought
court enforcement of a covenant which prohibited "any person not of the Caucasian race,"
specifically those "people of the Negro or Mongolian Race," from occupying the residences.
Id. at 5. The Supreme Court of Missouri enforced the covenant, and thereby restrained the
Shelleys from taking possession of the property. Id. at 6. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's holding and stated that restrictive covenants alone do not violate
equal protection, however, the judicial enforcement of the covenant constituted "state ac-
tion," and therefore, violated the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. Id. at
20.
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dignity clause saw a need to prohibit discrimination and a means
to accomplish this goal through an all-encompassing equal protec-
tion provision. By including the private action portion in the
clause, the drafters prohibited all discrimination and, thus, fur-
thered an intent to eradicate discrimination in Montana. To allow
individuals to defend discriminatory acts as a right to privacy
would contradict the drafters' intent to prohibit all discrimination
in Montana.
Second, although critics of a strong equal protection clause
may argue that judicial enforcement of equal protection would
constitute "state action," similar to the rule dictated in Shelley v.
Kraemer,"2 such enforcement of a constitutional right should not
be construed as "state action. '8 3 The Shelley Court was not inter-
preting, nor could it have envisioned, an equal protection clause
which prohibited the entire spectrum of discrimination; instead,
the Court was deciding at what point a private agreement that dis-
criminates becomes state action. 4 The U.S. Supreme Court went
to great length to define "state action" in Shelley v. Kraemer, stat-
ing that "the prohibitions of the [fourteenth] amendment extend
to all action of the State denying equal protection of the laws...
,,s5 In Shelley, the Supreme Court of Missouri was enforcing re-
strictive covenants which furthered discrimination, and thereby
denied equal protection. Conversely, under Montana's equal pro-
tection clause, the courts would be enforcing a person's right to
equal protection and thereby denying discrimination. This distinc-
tion is crucial. Actions to prohibit discrimination should not be la-
beled "state action" simply because individuals who are discrimi-
nated against can seek redress and enforcement of their right to
equal protection only through the courts or other governmental
agencies of Montana.
Finally, when the Bill of Rights Committee recommended the
adoption of the right to privacy provision, the drafters stated that
they intended to erect a "semipermeable wall of separation be-
tween individual and state . . . . " The drafters clearly intended to
protect the privacy of individual persons only, not corporations or
any other entity considered a "person" by law.8 7 Thus, in Delegate
82. Id. at 1.
83. For the facts of Shelley v. Kraemer, see supra note 81.
84. The Court stated that the fourteenth amendment "erects no shield against merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13.
85. Id. at 14 (quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879)).
86. V TRANSCRIPrs, supra note 1, at 1681.
87. Id. at 1680-81. The delegates unanimously approved an amendment to the original
proposal to limit the right of privacy solely to individuals and thus "exclude any question
568 [Vol. 51
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Habedank's example, the Sons of Norway could not invoke the
protections of the privacy clause to defeat a challenge to their
membership policies.
Furthermore, the delegates debated at great length over the
inclusion or exclusion of the words "without the showing of a com-
pelling state interest." At one point, the delegates chose to delete
the words,88 then upon reconsideration, voted to replace the
words.89 The final resolution is critical to the application of the
privacy clause because the clause as read demonstrates an appar-
ent intent to limit its application only to those intrusions initiated
by the government.90 The constitution drafters, therefore, had a
very limited intent in enacting the right to privacy: to erect a wall
to protect the individual's privacy from governmental intrusion,
absent a compelling state interest. This limited language does not
evoke an intent by the drafters also to bar an individual's right to
equal protection. Thus, the drafters of the Montana Constitution
could not have intended to both create a right and destroy its effi-
cacy in the same hand.
To fulfill the intent of the drafters and eradicate discrimina-
tion in Montana, the courts of Montana must prohibit discrimina-
tion in both the private and public sectors, a task made easier by
the express language of the individual dignity clause which does
not require a finding of "state action." Also, the courts cannot al-
low those who discriminate to argue that their right of privacy pro-
tects such discrimination, because that was not the intent of pri-
vacy provision drafters, and those arguments would only serve to
frustrate the purpose of equal protection. For these reasons, the
interpretation of Montana's privacy clause should not override the
interests of private individuals seeking their constitutional right of
equal protection.
VII. CONCLUSION
As Montanans consider whether to call another Montana Con-
about a government or a corporation." Id. at 1681.
88. Id. at 1682.
89. VI TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 1852.
90. Delegate Ask, the delegate who first moved to delete "without the showing of a
compelling state interest," then moved to reconsider the deletion, emphasized the need to
include this phrase so that the right was not "absolute" but could be infringed by a showing
of a compelling state interest. He added, "we don't have absolute, complete right to privacy
in all phases. The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't feel that way, and certainly when there is a
compelling state interest, they can invade privacy." Id. at 1851 (emphasis added). Delegate
Ask probably intended the word "they" to mean the state possessing the compelling
interest. 17
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stitutional Convention, each provision of the current document
must be evaluated. Until now, the private discrimination portion of
Montana's equal protection clause has escaped application and
definition. However, if the Montana Supreme Court uses a proper,
broad analysis, which would facilitate the elimination of discrimi-
nation in the state, Montana will provide greater protection from
favoritism and intolerance than any other state in the union. The
Montana Supreme Court must fashion an analysis similar to that
used by the courts of Puerto Rico, which prohibits discrimination
by individuals as well as the government.
In 1972 Montanans saw the need for broad protections of the
state's citizens, and consequently ratified a clause which should
protect each citizen from all forms of discrimination, both public
and private, with malleable language to change as the state
changed. Instead of removing this important language, the un-
touched language of Montana's individual dignity clause should be
given to the judiciary to mold and nurture, and thus promote the
eradication of discrimination as the drafters intended.
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